Inaccuracies in conventional dependency-tracking methods frequently undermine the security and integrity of modern software supply chains. This paper introduces a kernel-level framework leveraging extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) to capture software build dependencies transparently in real time. Our approach provides tamper-evident, intrinsic identifiers of build-time dependencies by computing cryptographic hashes of files accessed during compilation and constructing Merkle trees based on the observed file content. In contrast to traditional static analysis, this kernel-level methodology accounts for conditional compilation, dead-code, selective library usage, and dynamic dependencies, yielding more precise Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) and Artifact Dependency Graphs (ADGs). We illustrate how existing SBOMs may omit dynamically loaded or ephemeral dependencies and discuss how kernel-level tracing can mitigate these omissions. The proposed system enhances trustworthiness in software artifacts by offering independently verifiable, kernel-level evidence of build provenance, thereby reducing supply chain risks and facilitating more accurate vulnerability management.