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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
AgentRiskBOM: A Risk-Scoping Security Bill of Materials f...
[Submitted on 20 Jun 2026] · 2026-06-23 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Agentic AI systems retrieve private context, invoke tools, write files, call external services, coordinate with other agents, and may act without human approval. Existing bill of materials artifacts improve transparency for dependencies, model metadata, and training provenance, but leave an agentic transparency gap: capability opacity, the absence of a structured account of what a deployed agent can access, remember, change, delegate, and prove afterward. This paper introduces AgentRiskBOM, a security BOM for risk-scoping tool-using AI agents. It is an additive layer over SBOM, AIBOM, and MLBOM artifacts, referencing them where authoritative while adding fields for runtime authority: autonomy, tool permissions, memory, credential scope, approval gates, audit signals, inter-agent communication, and external action capability. We implement AgentRiskBOM as a JSON-schema artifact with a reproducible corpus, risk scenarios, scorer, diff detector, control mapper, and reports. We evaluate AgentRiskBOM on 13 open-source agents spanning coding, RAG, and multi-agent archetypes, plus 52 risk scenarios across 14 categories. The schema validates all 13 corpus artifacts. Coverage analysis gives AgentRiskBOM a native-equivalent score of 14 across 16 capability dimensions, vs. 1 for SBOM, 1.5 for AIBOM and 2 for MLBOM. Across modeled risk categories, AgentRiskBOM exposes 100% risk-category visibility vs. 10.5% for SBOM-like and 20.9% for AIBOM-like views. To test agentic authority drift, we inject 33 structured deployment mutations; the diff detector identifies the correct change type for all mutations. A secondary penalty-based scorer yields a Spearman correlation of 0.73 with the primary scorer, supporting rank-level consistency while showing that thresholds require human calibration. The results show that agentic AI security needs a machine-readable authority-and-risk artifact before incidents occur.

Submission history

From: Srimonti Dutta [view email]
[v1] Sat, 20 Jun 2026 04:38:41 UTC (319 KB)