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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Membership Inference Attack with Partial Features
Xurun Wang, Guangrui Liu, Xinjie Li, Haoyu He, Lin Yao, Zhongyun · 2025-08-08 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Machine learning models are vulnerable to membership inference attack, which can be used to determine whether a given sample appears in the training data. Most existing methods assume the attacker has full access to the features of the target sample. This assumption, however, does not hold in many real-world scenarios where only partial features are available, thereby limiting the applicability of these methods. In this work, we introduce Partial Feature Membership Inference (PFMI), a scenario where the adversary observes only partial features of each sample and aims to infer whether this observed subset was present in the training set. To address this problem, we propose MRAD (Memory-guided Reconstruction and Anomaly Detection), a two-stage attack framework that works in both white-box and black-box settings. In the first stage, MRAD leverages the latent memory of the target model to reconstruct the unknown features of the sample. We observe that when the known features are absent from the training set, the reconstructed sample deviates significantly from the true data distribution. Consequently, in the second stage, we use anomaly detection algorithms to measure the deviation between the reconstructed sample and the training data distribution, thereby determining whether the known features belong to a member of the training set. Empirical results demonstrate that MRAD is effective across various datasets, and maintains compatibility with off-the-shelf anomaly detection techniques. For example, on STL-10, our attack exceeds an AUC of around 0.75 even with 60% of the missing features.