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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Dynamic detection of mobile malware using smartphone data...
J. S. Panman de Wit, J. van der Ham, D. Bucur · 2021-07-23 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Mobile malware are malicious programs that target mobile devices. They are an increasing problem, as seen in the rise of detected mobile malware samples per year. The number of active smartphone users is expected to grow, stressing the importance of research on the detection of mobile malware. Detection methods for mobile malware exist but are still limited. In this paper, we provide an overview of the performance of machine learning (ML) techniques to detect malware on Android, without using privileged access. The ML-classifiers use device information such as the CPU usage, battery usage, and memory usage for the detection of 10 subtypes of Mobile Trojans on the Android Operating System (OS). We use a real-life dataset containing device and malware data from 47 users for a year (2016). We examine which features, i.e. aspects, of a device, are most important to monitor to detect (subtypes of) Mobile Trojans. The focus of this paper is on dynamic hardware features. Using these dynamic features we apply state-of-the-art machine learning classifiers: Random Forest, K-Nearest Neighbour, and AdaBoost. We show classification results on different feature sets, making a distinction between global device features, and specific app features. None of the measured feature sets require privileged access. Our results show that the Random Forest classifier performs best as a general malware classifier: across 10 subtypes of Mobile Trojans, it achieves an F1 score of 0.73 with a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 0.009 and a False Negative Rate (FNR) of 0.380. The Random Forest, K-Nearest Neighbours, and AdaBoost classifiers achieve F1 scores above 0.72, an FPR below 0.02 and, an FNR below 0.33, when trained separately to detect each subtype of Mobile Trojans.