惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
V
Visual Studio Blog
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
The GitHub Blog
The GitHub Blog
月光博客
月光博客
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
小众软件
小众软件
Y
Y Combinator Blog
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
P
Proofpoint News Feed
B
Blog RSS Feed
博客园 - 司徒正美
A
About on SuperTechFans
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
博客园 - 聂微东
Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft Security Blog
Recent Announcements
Recent Announcements
博客园 - Franky
U
Unit 42
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
T
The Blog of Author Tim Ferriss
GbyAI
GbyAI
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Towards an Automated Pipeline for Detecting and Classifyi...
Nicola Loi, Claudio Borile, Daniele Ucci · 2021-06-10 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

The constant growth in the number of malware - software or code fragment potentially harmful for computers and information networks - and the use of sophisticated evasion and obfuscation techniques have seriously hindered classic signature-based approaches. On the other hand, malware detection systems based on machine learning techniques started offering a promising alternative to standard approaches, drastically reducing analysis time and turning out to be more robust against evasion and obfuscation techniques. In this paper, we propose a malware taxonomic classification pipeline able to classify Windows Portable Executable files (PEs). Given an input PE sample, it is first classified as either malicious or benign. If malicious, the pipeline further analyzes it in order to establish its threat type, family, and behavior(s). We tested the proposed pipeline on the open source dataset EMBER, containing approximately 1 million PE samples, analyzed through static analysis. Obtained malware detection results are comparable to other academic works in the current state of art and, in addition, we provide an in-depth classification of malicious samples. Models used in the pipeline provides interpretable results which can help security analysts in better understanding decisions taken by the automated pipeline.