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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Private Counting of Distinct Elements in the Turnstile Mo...
Monika Henzinger, A. R. Sricharan, Teresa Anna Steiner · 2024-08-21 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Privately counting distinct elements in a stream is a fundamental data analysis problem with many applications in machine learning. In the turnstile model, Jain et al. [NeurIPS2023] initiated the study of this problem parameterized by the maximum flippancy of any element, i.e., the number of times that the count of an element changes from 0 to above 0 or vice versa. They give an item-level $(ε,δ)$-differentially private algorithm whose additive error is tight with respect to that parameterization. In this work, we show that a very simple algorithm based on the sparse vector technique achieves a tight additive error for item-level $(ε,δ)$-differential privacy and item-level $ε$-differential privacy with regards to a different parameterization, namely the sum of all flippancies. Our second result is a bound which shows that for a large class of algorithms, including all existing differentially private algorithms for this problem, the lower bound from item-level differential privacy extends to event-level differential privacy. This partially answers an open question by Jain et al. [NeurIPS2023].