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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Online Shift Detection and Conformal Adaptation for Deplo...
[Submitted on 10 Jun 2026 (v1), last revised 4 Aug 2026 (this ve · 2026-06-10 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Reasoning models deployed as safety monitors exhibit a systematic vulnerability: reasoning-token budget starvation. Adversarial inputs require $3.3\times$ more reasoning tokens than benign inputs to produce valid safety scores ($T_{50,\text{adv}}{=}154$ vs. $T_{50,\text{benign}}{=}46$ for o3), so low-budget deployments silently starve the monitor on exactly the inputs it must catch. This compounds the central failure mode: gradient-based evasion remains the residual threat -- template jailbreaks fail at 99%, but GCG-optimized suffixes flip encoder decisions reliably.
We systematize a canary construction -- score-disagreement monitoring between a targeted and un-targeted classifier -- and quantify its reliability under targeted evasion. We derive the exact security boundary -- a confidence-gated equilibrium at which a monitor-aware attacker stalls (validated gap $= 1/(2\lambda)$, within 95% CI of theory) -- and identify a failure mode in post-shift conformal adaptation.
Three contributions. (1) Factorial drift benchmark. A pre-registered 800-cell evaluation ($4$ classifiers $\times$ $5$ shift types $\times$ $20$ seeds $\times$ $2$ windows) reveals detection difficulty is dominated by a classifier$\times$shift interaction ($\eta^2 = 0.185$): encoders detect paraphrase drift in 28 steps but miss adversarial suffixes for 37; decoders show the opposite. (2) Conformal collapse in generative embeddings. Weighted conformal prediction fails on decoder classifiers: logistic density-ratio estimation achieves perfect separability in 3584--4096-dimensional space, clipping all importance weights to zero. Projecting to $\leq$32 dimensions restores coverage (+33pp). (3) Adversarial canary threat model. Across 35 frontier models, a 4-tier threat model yields deployment guarantees ($\geq$71% detection, $<$1.5% FPR at $N{=}1000$)

Submission history

From: Jun Wen Leong [view email]
[v1] Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:24:25 UTC (139 KB)
[v2] Mon, 29 Jun 2026 18:06:38 UTC (187 KB)
[v3] Tue, 4 Aug 2026 05:35:27 UTC (184 KB)