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Interference Alignment for the Multi-Antenna Compound Wir...
Ashish Khisti · 2010-02-24 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

We study a wiretap channel model where the sender has $M$ transmit antennas and there are two groups consisting of $J_1$ and $J_2$ receivers respectively. Each receiver has a single antenna. We consider two scenarios. First we consider the compound wiretap model -- group 1 constitutes the set of legitimate receivers, all interested in a common message, whereas group 2 is the set of eavesdroppers. We establish new lower and upper bounds on the secure degrees of freedom. Our lower bound is based on the recently proposed \emph{real interference alignment} scheme. The upper bound provides the first known example which illustrates that the \emph{pairwise upper bound} used in earlier works is not tight. The second scenario we study is the compound private broadcast channel. Each group is interested in a message that must be protected from the other group. Upper and lower bounds on the degrees of freedom are developed by extending the results on the compound wiretap channel.