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On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Concerned with Data Contamination? Assessing Countermeasu...
Jialun Cao, Wuqi Zhang, Shing-Chi Cheung · 2024-03-26 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Various techniques have been proposed to leverage the capabilities of code language models (CLMs) for SE tasks. While these techniques typically evaluate their effectiveness using publicly available datasets, the evaluation can be subject to data contamination threats where the evaluation datasets have already been used to train the concerned CLMs. This can significantly affect the reliability of the evaluation. Different countermeasures have been suggested to mitigate the data contamination threat. Countermeasures include using more recent data, curating new data, and refactoring existing data are introduced, yet it is unclear whether these countermeasures could really mitigate data contamination threats to model evaluation. To fill the gap, we systematically study to quantify the impacts of these countermeasures on CLMs' performance. To facilitate the study, we collected over 2 million Python functions with timestamps ranging from January 1st, 2018, to December 31st, 2023. The data created before the models' cut-off date are considered "contaminated data", while the data where the countermeasures are taken are regarded as "cleansed data". We study the impact of these countermeasures by investigating the difference in CLMs' performance on contaminated and cleansed data derived from different countermeasures. Our experiments yield several interesting observations. For instance, CLMs do not necessarily perform worse on data after the models' cut-off date; on the contrary, they sometimes perform better. In addition, refactoring did not always result in decreased performance; it could lead to improvements instead. Furthermore, existing metrics such as perplexity cannot distinguish contaminated/cleansed data. We hope that the results and observations could help deepen the understanding of CLMs' capabilities and inform the community about data contamination.