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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
CensorLab: A Testbed for Censorship Experimentation
Jade Sheffey, Amir Houmansadr · 2024-12-21 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Censorship and censorship circumvention are closely connected, and each is constantly making decisions in reaction to the other. When censors deploy a new Internet censorship technique, the anti-censorship community scrambles to find and develop circumvention strategies against the censor's new strategy, i.e., by targeting and exploiting specific vulnerabilities in the new censorship mechanism. We believe that over-reliance on such a reactive approach to circumvention has given the censors the upper hand in the censorship arms race, becoming a key reason for the inefficacy of in-the-wild circumvention systems. Therefore, we argue for a proactive approach to censorship research: the anti-censorship community should be able to proactively develop circumvention mechanisms against hypothetical or futuristic censorship strategies. To facilitate proactive censorship research, we design and implement CensorLab, a generic platform for emulating Internet censorship scenarios. CensorLab aims to complement currently reactive circumvention research by efficiently emulating past, present, and hypothetical censorship strategies in realistic network environments. Specifically, CensorLab aims to (1) support all censorship mechanisms previously or currently deployed by real-world censors; (2) support the emulation of hypothetical (not-yet-deployed) censorship strategies including advanced data-driven censorship mechanisms (e.g., ML-based traffic classifiers); (3) provide an easy-to-use platform for researchers and practitioners enabling them to perform extensive experimentation; and (4) operate efficiently with minimal overhead. We have implemented CensorLab as a fully functional, flexible, and high-performance platform, and showcase how it can be used to emulate a wide range of censorship scenarios, from traditional IP blocking and keyword filtering to hypothetical ML-based censorship mechanisms.