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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Kitten or Panda? Measuring the Specificity of Threat Grou...
Aakanksha Saha, Martina Lindorfer, Juan Caballero · 2025-06-12 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

In recent years, the cyber threat intelligence (CTI) community has invested significant effort in building knowledge bases that catalog threat groups. These knowledge bases associate each threat group with its observed behaviors, including their Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) as well as the malware and tools they employ during attacks. However, the distinctiveness and completeness of such behavioral profiles remain largely unexplored, despite being critical for tasks such as threat group attribution. In this work, we systematically analyze threat group profiles built from two public CTI knowledge bases: MITRE ATT&CK and Malpedia. We first investigate what fraction of threat groups have group-specific behaviors, i.e., behaviors used exclusively by a single group. We find that only 34% of threat groups in ATT&CK have group-specific techniques, limiting the use of techniques as reliable behavioral signatures to identify the threat group behind an attack. The software used by a threat group proves to be more distinctive, with 73% of ATT&CK groups using group-specific software. However, this percentage drops to 24% in the broader Malpedia dataset. Next, we evaluate how group profiles improve when data from both sources are combined. While coverage improves modestly, the proportion of groups with group-specific behaviors remains under 30%. We then enhance profiles by adding exploited vulnerabilities and additional techniques extracted from threat reports. Despite the additional information, 64% of groups still lack any group-specific behavior. Our findings raise concerns about the specificity of existing behavioral profiles and highlight the need for caution, as well as further improvement, when using them for threat group attribution.