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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Attack by Yourself: Effective and Unnoticeable Multi-Cate...
Jiangtong Li, Dungy Liu, Dawei Cheng, Changchun Jiang · 2024-12-23 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

\textbf{G}raph \textbf{N}eural \textbf{N}etworks~(GNNs) have achieved significant success in various real-world applications, including social networks, finance systems, and traffic management. Recent researches highlight their vulnerability to backdoor attacks in node classification, where GNNs trained on a poisoned graph misclassify a test node only when specific triggers are attached. These studies typically focus on single attack categories and use adaptive trigger generators to create node-specific triggers. However, adaptive trigger generators typically have a simple structure, limited parameters, and lack category-aware graph knowledge, which makes them struggle to handle backdoor attacks across multiple categories as the number of target categories increases. We address this gap by proposing a novel approach for \textbf{E}ffective and \textbf{U}nnoticeable \textbf{M}ulti-\textbf{C}ategory~(EUMC) graph backdoor attacks, leveraging subgraph from the attacked graph as category-aware triggers to precisely control the target category. To ensure the effectiveness of our method, we construct a \textbf{M}ulti-\textbf{C}ategory \textbf{S}ubgraph \textbf{T}riggers \textbf{P}ool~(MC-STP) using the subgraphs of the attacked graph as triggers. We then exploit the attachment probability shifts of each subgraph trigger as category-aware priors for target category determination. Moreover, we develop a ``select then attach'' strategy that connects suitable category-aware trigger to attacked nodes for unnoticeability. Extensive experiments across different real-world datasets confirm the efficacy of our method in conducting multi-category graph backdoor attacks on various GNN models and defense strategies.