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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Exploiting the Sensitivity of $L_2$ Adversarial Examples ...
Fei Zuo, Qiang Zeng · 2020-01-01 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

By adding carefully crafted perturbations to input images, adversarial examples (AEs) can be generated to mislead neural-network-based image classifiers. $L_2$ adversarial perturbations by Carlini and Wagner (CW) are among the most effective but difficult-to-detect attacks. While many countermeasures against AEs have been proposed, detection of adaptive CW-$L_2$ AEs is still an open question. We find that, by randomly erasing some pixels in an $L_2$ AE and then restoring it with an inpainting technique, the AE, before and after the steps, tends to have different classification results, while a benign sample does not show this symptom. We thus propose a novel AE detection technique, Erase-and-Restore (E&R), that exploits the intriguing sensitivity of $L_2$ attacks. Experiments conducted on two popular image datasets, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, show that the proposed technique is able to detect over 98% of $L_2$ AEs and has a very low false positive rate on benign images. The detection technique exhibits high transferability: a detection system trained using CW-$L_2$ AEs can accurately detect AEs generated using another $L_2$ attack method. More importantly, our approach demonstrates strong resilience to adaptive $L_2$ attacks, filling a critical gap in AE detection. Finally, we interpret the detection technique through both visualization and quantification.