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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
How Reliable is the Crowdsourced Knowledge of Security Im...
Mengsu Chen, Felix Fischer, Na Meng, Xiaoyin Wang, Jens Grosskla · 2019-01-05 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Stack Overflow (SO) is the most popular online Q&A site for developers to share their expertise in solving programming issues. Given multiple answers to certain questions, developers may take the accepted answer, the answer from a person with high reputation, or the one frequently suggested. However, researchers recently observed exploitable security vulnerabilities in popular SO answers. This observation inspires us to explore the following questions: How much can we trust the security implementation suggestions on SO? If suggested answers are vulnerable, can developers rely on the community's dynamics to infer the vulnerability and identify a secure counterpart? To answer these highly important questions, we conducted a study on SO posts by contrasting secure and insecure advices with the community-given content evaluation. We investigated whether SO incentive mechanism is effective in improving security properties of distributed code examples. Moreover, we also traced duplicated answers to assess whether the community behavior facilitates propagation of secure and insecure code suggestions. We compiled 953 different groups of similar security-related code examples and labeled their security, identifying 785 secure answer posts and 644 insecure ones. Compared with secure suggestions, insecure ones had higher view counts (36,508 vs. 18,713), received a higher score (14 vs. 5), and had significantly more duplicates (3.8 vs. 3.0) on average. 34% of the posts provided by highly reputable so-called trusted users were insecure. Our findings show that there are lots of insecure snippets on SO, while the community-given feedback does not allow differentiating secure from insecure choices. Moreover, the reputation mechanism fails in indicating trustworthy users with respect to security questions, ultimately leaving other users wandering around alone in a software security minefield.