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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Predictive Response Optimization: Using Reinforcement Lea...
Garrett Wilson, Geoffrey Goh, Yan Jiang, Ajay Gupta, Jiaxuan Wan · 2025-02-25 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Detecting phishing, spam, fake accounts, data scraping, and other malicious activity in online social networks (OSNs) is a problem that has been studied for well over a decade, with a number of important results. Nearly all existing works on abuse detection have as their goal producing the best possible binary classifier; i.e., one that labels unseen examples as "benign" or "malicious" with high precision and recall. However, no prior published work considers what comes next: what does the service actually do after it detects abuse? In this paper, we argue that detection as described in previous work is not the goal of those who are fighting OSN abuse. Rather, we believe the goal to be selecting actions (e.g., ban the user, block the request, show a CAPTCHA, or "collect more evidence") that optimize a tradeoff between harm caused by abuse and impact on benign users. With this framing, we see that enlarging the set of possible actions allows us to move the Pareto frontier in a way that is unattainable by simply tuning the threshold of a binary classifier. To demonstrate the potential of our approach, we present Predictive Response Optimization (PRO), a system based on reinforcement learning that utilizes available contextual information to predict future abuse and user-experience metrics conditioned on each possible action, and select actions that optimize a multi-dimensional tradeoff between abuse/harm and impact on user experience. We deployed versions of PRO targeted at stopping automated activity on Instagram and Facebook. In both cases our experiments showed that PRO outperforms a baseline classification system, reducing abuse volume by 59% and 4.5% (respectively) with no negative impact to users. We also present several case studies that demonstrate how PRO can quickly and automatically adapt to changes in business constraints, system behavior, and/or adversarial tactics.