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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Secure Multiparty Generative AI
Manil Shrestha, Yashodha Ravichandran, Edward Kim · 2024-09-28 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

As usage of generative AI tools skyrockets, the amount of sensitive information being exposed to these models and centralized model providers is alarming. For example, confidential source code from Samsung suffered a data leak as the text prompt to ChatGPT encountered data leakage. An increasing number of companies are restricting the use of LLMs (Apple, Verizon, JPMorgan Chase, etc.) due to data leakage or confidentiality issues. Also, an increasing number of centralized generative model providers are restricting, filtering, aligning, or censoring what can be used. Midjourney and RunwayML, two of the major image generation platforms, restrict the prompts to their system via prompt filtering. Certain political figures are restricted from image generation, as well as words associated with women's health care, rights, and abortion. In our research, we present a secure and private methodology for generative artificial intelligence that does not expose sensitive data or models to third-party AI providers. Our work modifies the key building block of modern generative AI algorithms, e.g. the transformer, and introduces confidential and verifiable multiparty computations in a decentralized network to maintain the 1) privacy of the user input and obfuscation to the output of the model, and 2) introduce privacy to the model itself. Additionally, the sharding process reduces the computational burden on any one node, enabling the distribution of resources of large generative AI processes across multiple, smaller nodes. We show that as long as there exists one honest node in the decentralized computation, security is maintained. We also show that the inference process will still succeed if only a majority of the nodes in the computation are successful. Thus, our method offers both secure and verifiable computation in a decentralized network.