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Abstract:Software supply-chain (SSC) attacks are increasingly multi-stage, cross-source, and temporally distributed. A single attack campaign may leave weak and fragmented traces across multi-source telemetry that captures different granularities and perspectives of runtime behavior. Existing runtime detection systems often analyze these sources independently, making it difficult to identify low-frequency attack evidence or reconstruct the temporal context in which it appears. We present FUSECHAIN, a runtime detection framework that represents multi-source software supply-chain telemetry as a temporal heterogeneous provenance graph over a unified event-time axis. By aligning package/runtime traces, process events, network telemetry, DNS/HTTP metadata, and security alerts on a unified temporal graph, FuseChain captures cross-source dependencies and sparse attack evidence that may be ambiguous within any individual source. It learns anomaly-centric temporal representations from benign-prefix telemetry and performs deployable attack-stage reconstruction through a lightweight decoder on top of a frozen anomaly backbone. Our experiments show that jointly optimizing anomaly detection and stage prediction is ineffective under sparse and imbalanced runtime supply-chain telemetry. Across seven SSC attack scenarios, FuseChain improves deployable stage reconstruction from 0.369 to 0.881 Stage Recall@500 with a frozen-backbone decoder, while adaptive retrieval further increases observable-stage recall from 0.524 to 0.655 without modifying the detector. These results highlight the deployable value of decoupling runtime SSC anomaly detection from downstream attack-stage interpretation.

Submission history

From: Zhuoran Tan [view email]
[v1] Sun, 14 Jun 2026 13:24:00 UTC (1,489 KB)