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TL++: Accuracy and Privacy Preserving Traversal Learning ...
[Submitted on 24 Jun 2026] · 2026-06-25 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Distributed intelligent systems increasingly need to train across data silos without centralizing raw data. Federated learning keeps data local but can suffer under heterogeneous partitions and requires repeated full-model exchange. Split learning reduces communication through cut-layer activations, but standard protocols generally do not recover centralized mini-batch gradient behavior and may expose activations and gradients in plaintext. We present TL++, a two-mode traversal-learning framework that constructs virtual batches across nodes to recover centralized mini-batch gradient behavior under explicit synchronization assumptions. Base mode exchanges cut-layer activations and gradients rather than full models. Secure mode secret-shares each cut-layer activation and gradient between an orchestrator and a non-colluding helper, preventing either server from observing plaintext cut-layer tensors. This protection is limited to a semi-honest two-server setting; labels and loss-related outputs remain visible to the orchestrator. In the lightweight secure path evaluated here, exactness requires a linear or affine server path, while nonlinear operations require nonlinear MPC or approximation. We formalize TL++, analyze communication and computation costs, and evaluate it against federated and split-learning baselines on CIFAR-10 and BioGPT/PubMedQA using full fine-tuning and LoRA. On CIFAR-10, TL++ base cut 1 and exact secure cut 3 achieve accuracies of 91.41% (SD 0.19) and 90.93% (SD 0.17), respectively, exceeding the strongest measured non-TL++ baseline by more than 12 percentage points. TL++ base cut 1 also reduces per-step communication by 13.1-fold relative to full-model synchronization. PubMedQA results similarly favor TL++. Overall, TL++ approaches centralized-training performance while reducing communication and providing activation-level secret sharing.

Submission history

From: Young Yoon [view email]
[v1] Wed, 24 Jun 2026 09:34:27 UTC (625 KB)