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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Recognition Without Mitigation: Ethical Frameworks in Aut...
[Submitted on 10 Jun 2025 (v1), last revised 29 Jul 2026 (this v · 2025-06-10 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Large language models have moved from advising on offensive security to autonomously conducting it. A growing literature presents agents that execute reconnaissance, exploitation, and privilege escalation against real or simulated targets. Such an agent is a deployable, re-pointable capability whose harm potential scales with the underlying model. The papers that introduce it therefore carry an unusual ethical burden, which top security venues have begun to encode as hard policy in 2025-2026 ethics-section mandates. We present a systematic, reproducible audit of ethics-and-risk reporting in this literature. From a pre-registered Scopus query (Channel A, n=35) plus a reproducible forward-snowball of two seed papers via the Semantic Scholar citation graph (Channel B, n=19, all Scopus-absent) we assemble 54 autonomous offensive-LLM penetration-testing prototypes (2023-2026). We score each against a nine-dimension instrument derived both top-down from the Menlo Report, and bottom-up from the 2025-26 venue mandates. Our central result is a recognition-without-mitigation gap: dual-use risk is reported as recognized in 39% of papers but a concrete mitigation is reported in only 7%, roughly a 5:1 gap. Of the papers, 17% are anti-safeguard, reporting the defeat of model safety controls with no countermeasure. The near-universal safeguards reported are research-integrity controls that protect the experiment, not the public; institutional-review (2%) and coordinated-disclosure (6%) practice is almost absent and confined to Channel B. Measured against the new mandates, the corpus defines a pre-regulation baseline: current practice does not meet the substantive requirements. We argue this audit is itself defensive intelligence on the offensive-agent ecosystem, and we distill a minimal containment checklist for future work.

Submission history

From: Andreas Happe [view email]
[v1] Tue, 10 Jun 2025 11:11:55 UTC (19 KB)
[v2] Sun, 31 May 2026 08:37:46 UTC (16 KB)
[v3] Wed, 29 Jul 2026 07:05:45 UTC (46 KB)