Remote attestation is one of the ways to verify the state of an untrusted device. Earlier research has attempted remote verification of a devices' state using hardware, software, or hybrid approaches. Majority of them have used Attestation Key as a hardware root of trust, which does not detect hardware modification or counterfeit issues. In addition, they do not have a secure communication channel between verifier and prover, which makes them susceptible to modern security attacks. This paper presents SEDAT, a novel methodology for remote attestation of the device via a security enhanced communication channel. SEDAT performs hardware, firmware, and software attestation. SEDAT enhances the communication protocol security between verifier and prover by using the Single Packet Authorization (SPA) technique, which provides replay and Denial of Service (DoS) protection. SEDAT provides a way for verifier to get on-demand device integrity and authenticity status via a secure channel. It also enables the verifier to detect counterfeit hardware, change in firmware, and software code on the device. SEDAT validates the manufacturers` root CA certificate, platform certificate, endorsement certificate (EK), and attributes certificates to perform platform hardware attestation. SEDAT is the first known tool that represents firmware, and Integrity Measurement Authority (IMA) event logs in the Canonical Event Logs (CEL) format (recommended by Trusted Computing Group). SEDAT is the first implementation, to the best of our knowledge, that showcases end to end hardware, firmware, and software remote attestation using Trusted Platform Module (TPM2.0) which is resilient to DoS and replay attacks. SEDAT is the first remote verifier that is capable of retrieving a TPM2.0 quote from prover and validate it after regeneration, using a software TPM2.0 quote check.