In this paper, we propose a canonical prune-and-SAT (CP&SAT) attack for breaking state-of-the-art routing-based obfuscation techniques. In the CP&SAT attack, we first encode the key-programmable routing blocks (keyRBs) based on an efficient SAT encoding mechanism suited for detailed routing constraints, and then efficiently re-encode and reduce the CNF corresponded to the keyRB using a bounded variable addition (BVA) algorithm. In the CP&SAT attack, this is done before subjecting the circuit to the SAT attack. We illustrate that this encoding and BVA-based pre-processing significantly reduces the size of the CNF corresponded to the routing-based obfuscated circuit, in the result of which we observe 100% success rate for breaking prior art routing-based obfuscation techniques. Further, we propose a new intercorrelated logic and routing locking technique, or in short InterLock, as a countermeasure to mitigate the CP&SAT attack. In Interlock, in addition to hiding the connectivity, a part of the logic (gates) in the selected timing paths are also implemented in the keyRB(s). We illustrate that when the logic gates are twisted with keyRBs, the BVA could not provide any advantage as a pre-processing step. Our experimental results show that, by using InterLock, with only three 8$\times$8 or only two 16x16 keyRBs (twisted with actual logic gates), the resilience against existing attacks as well as our new proposed CP&SAT attack would be guaranteed while, on average, the delay/area overhead is less than 10% for even medium-size benchmark circuits.