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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Bypassing Array Canaries via Autonomous Function Call Res...
Nathaniel Oh, Paul Attie, Anas Obeidat · 2025-01-23 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

We observed the Array Canary, a novel JavaScript anti-analysis technique currently exploited in-the-wild by the Phishing-as-a-Service framework Darcula. The Array Canary appears to be an advanced form of the array shuffling techniques employed by the Emotet JavaScript downloader. In practice, a series of Array Canaries are set within a string array and if modified will cause the program to endlessly loop. In this paper, we demonstrate how an Array Canary works and discuss Autonomous Function Call Resolution (AFCR), which is a method we created to bypass Array Canaries. We also introduce Arphsy, a proof-of-concept for AFCR designed to guide Large Language Models and security researchers in the deobfuscation of "canaried" JavaScript code. We accomplish this by (i) Finding and extracting all Immediately Invoked Function Expressions from a canaried file, (ii) parsing the file's Abstract Syntax Tree for any function that does not implement imported function calls, (iii) identifying the most reassigned variable and its corresponding function body, (iv) calculating the length of the largest string array and uses it to determine the offset values within the canaried file, (v) aggregating all the previously identified functions into a single file, and (vi) appending driver code into the verified file and using it to deobfuscate the canaried file.