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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Privacy-Preserving Inference in Machine Learning Services...
Krishna Giri Narra, Zhifeng Lin, Yongqin Wang, Keshav Balasubram · 2019-12-07 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

This work presents Origami, which provides privacy-preserving inference for large deep neural network (DNN) models through a combination of enclave execution, cryptographic blinding, interspersed with accelerator-based computation. Origami partitions the ML model into multiple partitions. The first partition receives the encrypted user input within an SGX enclave. The enclave decrypts the input and then applies cryptographic blinding to the input data and the model parameters. Cryptographic blinding is a technique that adds noise to obfuscate data. Origami sends the obfuscated data for computation to an untrusted GPU/CPU. The blinding and de-blinding factors are kept private by the SGX enclave, thereby preventing any adversary from denoising the data, when the computation is offloaded to a GPU/CPU. The computed output is returned to the enclave, which decodes the computation on noisy data using the unblinding factors privately stored within SGX. This process may be repeated for each DNN layer, as has been done in prior work Slalom. However, the overhead of blinding and unblinding the data is a limiting factor to scalability. Origami relies on the empirical observation that the feature maps after the first several layers can not be used, even by a powerful conditional GAN adversary to reconstruct input. Hence, Origami dynamically switches to executing the rest of the DNN layers directly on an accelerator without needing any further cryptographic blinding intervention to preserve privacy. We empirically demonstrate that using Origami, a conditional GAN adversary, even with an unlimited inference budget, cannot reconstruct the input. We implement and demonstrate the performance gains of Origami using the VGG-16 and VGG-19 models. Compared to running the entire VGG-19 model within SGX, Origami inference improves the performance of private inference from 11x while using Slalom to 15.1x.