Establishing a secure connection between wireless devices has become significantly important with the increasing number of Wi-Fi products coming to the market. In order to provide an easy and secure pairing standard, the Wi-Fi Alliance has designed the Wi-Fi Protected Setup. Push-Button Configuration (PBC) is part of this standard and is especially useful for pairing devices with physical limitations. However, PBC is proven to be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Tamper-Evident Pairing (TEP) is an improvement of the PBC standard, which aims to fix the MITM vulnerability without interfering the useful properties of PBC. It relies on the Tamper-Evident Announcement (TEA), which guarantees that an adversary can neither tamper a transmitted message without being detected, nor hide the fact that the message has been sent. The security properties of TEP were proven manually by its authors and tested with the Uppaal and Spin model checkers. During the Uppaal model checking, no vulnerabilities were found. However, the Spin model revealed a case, in which the TEP's security is not guaranteed. In this paper, we first provide a comprehensive overview of the TEP protocol, including all information needed to understand how it works. Furthermore, we summarize the security checks performed on it, give the circumstances, under which it is no longer resistant to MITM attacks and explain the reasons why they could not be revealed with the first model. Nevertheless, future work is required to gain full certainty of the TEP's security before applying it in the industry.