Memory spatial errors, i.e., buffer overflow vulnerabilities, have been a well-known issue in computer security for a long time and remain one of the root causes of exploitable vulnerabilities. Most of the existing mitigation tools adopt a fail-stop strategy to protect programs from intrusions, which means the victim program will be terminated upon detecting a memory safety violation. Unfortunately, the fail-stop strategy harms the availability of software. In this paper, we propose Saturation Memory Access (SMA), a memory spatial error mitigation mechanism that prevents out-of-bounds access without terminating a program. SMA is based on a key observation that developers generally do not rely on out-of-bounds accesses to implement program logic. SMA modifies dynamic memory allocators and adds paddings to objects to form an enlarged object boundary. By dynamically correcting all the out-of-bounds accesses to operate on the enlarged protecting boundaries, SMA can tolerate out-of-bounds accesses. For the sake of compatibility, we chose tagged pointers to record the boundary metadata of a memory object in the pointer itself, and correct the address upon detecting out-of-bounds access. We have implemented the prototype of SMA on LLVM 10.0. Our results show that our compiler enables the programs to execute successfully through buffer overflow attacks. Experiments on MiBench show that our prototype incurs an overhead of 78\%. Further optimizations would require ISA supports.