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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Stealing Knowledge from Protected Deep Neural Networks Us...
Itay Mosafi, Eli David, Nathan S. Netanyahu · 2019-12-09 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

As state-of-the-art deep neural networks are deployed at the core of more advanced Al-based products and services, the incentive for copying them (i.e., their intellectual properties) by rival adversaries is expected to increase considerably over time. The best way to extract or steal knowledge from such networks is by querying them using a large dataset of random samples and recording their output, followed by training a student network to mimic these outputs, without making any assumption about the original networks. The most effective way to protect against such a mimicking attack is to provide only the classification result, without confidence values associated with the softmax layer.In this paper, we present a novel method for generating composite images for attacking a mentor neural network using a student model. Our method assumes no information regarding the mentor's training dataset, architecture, or weights. Further assuming no information regarding the mentor's softmax output values, our method successfully mimics the given neural network and steals all of its knowledge. We also demonstrate that our student network (which copies the mentor) is impervious to watermarking protection methods, and thus would not be detected as a stolen model.Our results imply, essentially, that all current neural networks are vulnerable to mimicking attacks, even if they do not divulge anything but the most basic required output, and that the student model which mimics them cannot be easily detected and singled out as a stolen copy using currently available techniques.