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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
XChainWatcher: Monitoring and Identifying Attacks in Cros...
André Augusto, Rafael Belchior, Jonas Pfannschmidt, André Vascon · 2024-10-03 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Cross-chain bridges are a type of middleware for blockchain interoperability that supports the transfer of assets and data across blockchains. However, several of these bridges have vulnerabilities that have caused 3.2 billion dollars in losses since May 2021. Some studies have revealed the existence of these vulnerabilities, but there is little quantitative research available, and there are no safeguard mechanisms to protect bridges from such attacks. Furthermore, no studies are available on the practices of cross-chain bridges that can cause financial losses. We propose \toolName~(Cross-Chain Watcher), a modular and extensible logic-driven anomaly detector for cross-chain bridges. It operates in three main phases: (1) decoding events and transactions from multiple blockchains, (2) building logic relations from the extracted data, and (3) evaluating these relations against a set of detection rules. Using \toolName, we analyze data from two previously attacked bridges: the Ronin and Nomad bridges. \toolName~was able to successfully identify the transactions that led to losses of \$611M and \$190M (USD) and surpassed the results obtained by a reputable security firm in the latter. We not only uncover successful attacks, but also reveal other anomalies, such as 37 cross-chain transactions (\CCTX) that these bridges should not have accepted, failed attempts to exploit Nomad, over \$7.8M worth of tokens locked on one chain but never released on Ethereum, and \$200K lost by users due to inadequate interaction with bridges. We provide the first open dataset of 81,000 \CCTXS~across three blockchains, capturing more than \$4.2B in token transfers.