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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Color Matters: Trigger Color Affects Success in Federated...
[Submitted on 24 Jun 2026] · 2026-06-25 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Federated learning is vulnerable to backdoor attacks in which malicious clients inject poisoned updates while preserving benign-task performance. In this paper, we study a semantics-driven backdoor mechanism in which attackers use natural visual accessories as triggers and manipulate only the trigger color while keeping the attack pipeline fixed. Our framework considers semantic trigger objects such as masks and sunglasses, instantiated in black and white variants, and evaluates their effect in a controlled federated learning setting. Malicious clients construct poisoned samples by applying a trigger to source-class images and relabeling them to an attacker-chosen target class, while benign clients train only on clean data. We analyze this mechanism under both a standard poisoning objective and a stronger SABLE-based objective that combines clean classification loss, triggered target loss, feature-separation loss in the penultimate representation space, and regularization to keep malicious updates close to the global model. This design enables the attack to remain effective while reducing excessive update drift. Experiments on a four-class CelebA hair-color task show that trigger color significantly changes attack success rate even when trigger semantics, placement, and poisoning budget are unchanged. White triggers are more effective for attacks targeting the blond class, whereas black triggers perform better for attacks targeting the black class. The same trend persists under robust aggregation, showing that trigger color is a meaningful factor in the operation, persistence, and evaluation of semantic backdoor mechanisms in federated learning.

Submission history

From: Kavindu Herath [view email]
[v1] Wed, 24 Jun 2026 14:07:10 UTC (1,833 KB)