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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
When Code Crosses Borders: A Security-Centric Study of LL...
Hailong Chang, Guozhu Meng, Shuhui Xiao, Kai Chen, Kun Sun, Yili · 2025-09-08 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Code translation is crucial for cross-language codebase migration, and large language models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising technique to automate this process. However, the security implications of using LLMs for code translation remain largely unexplored, as existing evaluations primarily focus on syntactic and functional correctness. To bridge this gap, we conduct a security-centric empirical study to investigate the risks of vulnerabilities being introduced or preserved during LLM-based translation. Our study involves a rigorous evaluation of five state-of-the-art LLMs on a curated dataset of 720 security-related code samples across four programming languages (Java, PHP, C, C++) and nine Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories. The results reveal significant security degradation, with 28.6\% to 45\% of translations introducing new vulnerabilities. Web-related flaws, particularly in input validation, proved most challenging for LLMs. Furthermore, we identify and categorize the root causes of these vulnerable translations into a taxonomy of five major error types. Based on our findings, we develop and evaluate a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based mitigation strategy, which successfully reduces the vulnerability introduction rate by 32.8\%. Our study provides the first large-scale evidence of serious security risks in LLM-based code translation and demonstrates the potential of knowledge-enhanced prompting to mitigate them.