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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
MalGEN: A Testbed for Modeling and Evaluating Malware Beh...
Bikash Saha, Sandeep Kumar Shukla · 2025-06-09 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Modern cybersecurity requires systematic ways to evaluate how detection systems respond to evolving and previously unseen attack behaviors. Existing malware repositories largely capture known patterns and provide limited support for stress-testing defenses against novel threats. To address this, we present MalGEN, a modular testbed that models adversarial workflows and generates executable artifacts in a controlled environment. The framework decomposes high-level attack objectives into structured stages, enabling the synthesis of diverse and multi-stage behaviors. We evaluate MalGEN across 1,920 benchmark settings covering multiple platforms and behavioral objectives, resulting in 977 executable samples. Analysis shows that the generated artifacts exhibit a wide range of malicious techniques and multi-stage attack patterns. However, 45.71% of these samples remain undetected by existing detection engines, which reveals notable gaps in current defenses. These findings provide practical insights into the limitations of widely used detection approaches and support the development of more robust security evaluation and testing practices.