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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Started Off Local, Now We're in the Cloud: Forensic Exami...
Jona Crasselt, Gaston Pugliese · 2024-08-28 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Amazon Echo is one of the most popular product families of smart speakers and displays. Considering their growing presence in modern households as well as the digital traces associated with residents' interactions with these devices, analyses of Echo products are likely to become more common for forensic investigators at "smart home" crime scenes. With this in mind, we present the first forensic examination of the Echo Show 15, Amazon's largest smart display running on Fire OS and the first Echo device with Visual ID, a face recognition feature. We unveil a non-invasive method for accessing the unencrypted file system of the Echo Show 15 based on an undocumented pinout for the eMMC interface which we discovered on the main logic board. On the device, we identify various local usage artifacts, such as searched products, streamed movies, visited websites, metadata of photos and videos as well as logged events of Visual ID about movements and users detected by the built-in camera. Furthermore, we utilize an insecurely stored token on the Echo Show 15 to obtain access to remote user artifacts in Amazon's cloud, including Alexa voice requests, calendars, contacts, conversations, photos, and videos. In this regard, we also identify new Amazon APIs through network traffic analysis of two companion apps, namely Alexa and Photos. Overall, in terms of practical relevance, our findings demonstrate a non-destructive way of data acquisition for Echo Show 15 devices as well as how to lift the scope of forensic traces from local artifacts on the device to remote artifacts stored in the cloud.