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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Am I a Real or Fake Celebrity? Measuring Commercial Face ...
Shahroz Tariq, Sowon Jeon, Simon S. Woo · 2021-03-01 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Recently, significant advancements have been made in face recognition technologies using Deep Neural Networks. As a result, companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Naver offer highly accurate commercial face recognition web services for diverse applications to meet the end-user needs. Naturally, however, such technologies are threatened persistently, as virtually any individual can quickly implement impersonation attacks. In particular, these attacks can be a significant threat for authentication and identification services, which heavily rely on their underlying face recognition technologies' accuracy and robustness. Despite its gravity, the issue regarding deepfake abuse using commercial web APIs and their robustness has not yet been thoroughly investigated. This work provides a measurement study on the robustness of black-box commercial face recognition APIs against Deepfake Impersonation (DI) attacks using celebrity recognition APIs as an example case study. We use five deepfake datasets, two of which are created by us and planned to be released. More specifically, we measure attack performance based on two scenarios (targeted and non-targeted) and further analyze the differing system behaviors using fidelity, confidence, and similarity metrics. Accordingly, we demonstrate how vulnerable face recognition technologies from popular companies are to DI attack, achieving maximum success rates of 78.0% and 99.9% for targeted (i.e., precise match) and non-targeted (i.e., match with any celebrity) attacks, respectively. Moreover, we propose practical defense strategies to mitigate DI attacks, reducing the attack success rates to as low as 0% and 0.02% for targeted and non-targeted attacks, respectively.