The authentication ceremony plays a crucial role in verifying the identities of users before exchanging messages in end-to-end encryption (E2EE) applications, thus preventing impersonation and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. Once authenticated, the subsequent communications in E2EE apps benefit from the protection provided by the authentication ceremony. However, the current implementation of the authentication ceremony in the Zoom application introduces a potential vulnerability that can make it highly susceptible to impersonation attacks. The existence of this vulnerability may undermine the integrity of E2EE, posing a potential security risk when E2EE becomes a mandatory feature in the Zoom application. In this paper, we examine and evaluate this vulnerability in two attack scenarios, one where the attacker is a malicious participant and another where the attacker is a malicious Zoom server with control over Zoom's server infrastructure and cloud providers. Our study aims to comprehensively examine the Zoom authentication ceremony, with a specific focus on the potential for impersonation attacks in static media and textual communications. We simulate a new session injection attack on Zoom E2EE meetings to evaluate the system's susceptibility to simple voice manipulations. Our simulation experiments show that Zoom's authentication ceremony is vulnerable to a simple voice manipulation, called a VOICE-ZEUS attack, by malicious participants and the malicious Zoom server. In this VOICE-ZEUS attack, an attacker creates a fingerprint in a victim's voice by reordering previously recorded digits spoken by the victim. We show how an attacker can record and reorder snippets of digits to generate a new security code that compromises a future Zoom meeting. We conclude that stronger security measures are necessary during the group authentication ceremony in Zoom to prevent impersonation attacks.