Steganographic protocols enable one to embed covert messages into inconspicuous data over a public communication channel in such a way that no one, aside from the sender and the intended receiver, can even detect the presence of the secret message. In this paper, we provide a new provably-secure, private-key steganographic encryption protocol secure in the framework of Hopper et al. We first present a "one-time stegosystem" that allows two parties to transmit messages of length at most that of the shared key with information-theoretic security guarantees. The employment of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) permits secure transmission of longer messages in the same way that such a generator allows the use of one-time pad encryption for messages longer than the key in symmetric encryption. The advantage of our construction, compared to all previous work is randomness efficiency: in the information theoretic setting our protocol embeds a message of length n bits using a shared secret key of length (1+o(1))n bits while achieving security 2^{-n/log^{O(1)}n}; simply put this gives a rate of key over message that is 1 as n tends to infinity (the previous best result achieved a constant rate greater than 1 regardless of the security offered). In this sense, our protocol is the first truly randomness efficient steganographic system. Furthermore, in our protocol, we can permit a portion of the shared secret key to be public while retaining precisely n private key bits. In this setting, by separating the public and the private randomness of the shared key, we achieve security of 2^{-n}. Our result comes as an effect of the application of randomness extractors to stegosystem design. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time extractors have been applied in steganography.