Retail central bank digital currency (rCBDC) is seen as a key upgrade of the monetary system in the 21st century. However, privacy concerns are the main impediment to rCBDC's development and roll-out. On the one hand, the rights of people to keep their transactions private should be protected, including against central bank surveillance. On the other hand, the central bank needs to ensure that no over-issuance of money or other frauds occur, demanding a certain form of knowledge of rCBDC transactions to safeguard against malicious users. This work focuses on rCBDC architectures based on the unspent transaction output (UTXO) data model and tackles the research problem of preserving a sufficient degree of privacy for UTXO transaction records while allowing the central bank to verify their correctness. User privacy is not adequately addressed in the UTXO-based rCBDC architectures. Using evolving public keys as pseudonyms to hide the real identities of users only solves the privacy issue partially. Some information could still be leaked out. This work investigates techniques to address the shortcomings of the pseudonym approach. First, a Pedersen commitment scheme is applied to hide the transaction values of a UTXO transaction while allowing the central bank to verify that no over-issuance of rCBDC has occurred in the transaction.This work uses a Schnorr signature to prove no over-issuance of money, which reduces overheads and enables a non-interactive proof. Then, Coinjoin is applied to aggregate UTXO transactions from different users into one larger UTXO transaction to obfuscate the payer-payee relationship while preserving the correctness of the amount of money flow. This work applies k-anonymity to analyse the privacy guarantee of Coinjoin. By modelling the transaction traffic by a Poisson process, the trade-off between anonymity and transaction confirmation time of Coinjoin is analysed.