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Abstract:Safety alignment requires language models to refuse harmful requests without losing the ability to answer benign ones. Existing robustness evaluations, however, do not reveal whether a model has learned to recognize harmfulness, to activate a refusal policy, or to couple these two processes. We study this question with a dual safety-geometry protocol that measures harmfulness carriers, refusal carriers, and their coupling across aligned instruction-tuned anchors and matched Mistral-7B-v0.1 SFT/R2D2 training trajectories. The aligned anchors validate the protocol: refusal-side interventions reopen attack success more strongly than harmfulness-only interventions, while harmfulness and refusal carriers remain nearly orthogonal. Along the Mistral trajectory, R2D2 exhibits a high-coupling early phase with strong fixed-source robustness, saturated safe-prompt refusal, and collapsed benign utility. Later checkpoints move to a lower-coupling regime with partial utility recovery and reopened attack success. SFT provides an important contrast: it also reaches low coupling, but remains substantially less robust, showing that low coupling alone is not a safety guarantee. All-anchor diagnostics and sparse GCG/AutoDAN transfer experiments further show that H/R coupling is informative in the R2D2 regime, whereas SFT transfer is better summarized by drift or behavior-state measures. Causal sweeps support fixed-protocol sensitivity relative to matched unit-direction controls, but do not establish independent harmfulness and refusal pathways. These results frame harmfulness--refusal coupling as an operational diagnostic for safety-geometry dynamics under adversarial fine-tuning.

Submission history

From: Wenhao Lan [view email]
[v1] Mon, 15 Jun 2026 07:50:00 UTC (317 KB)