Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks identify the websites visited by users by performing traffic analysis, compromising user privacy. Particularly, DL-based WF attacks demonstrate impressive attack performance. However, the effectiveness of DL-based WF attacks relies on the collected complete and pure traffic during the page loading, which impacts the practicality of these attacks. The WF performance is rather low under dynamic network conditions and various WF defenses, particularly when the analyzed traffic is only a small part of the complete traffic. In this paper, we propose Holmes, a robust and reliable early-stage WF attack. Holmes utilizes temporal and spatial distribution analysis of website traffic to effectively identify websites in the early stages of page loading. Specifically, Holmes develops adaptive data augmentation based on the temporal distribution of website traffic and utilizes a supervised contrastive learning method to extract the correlations between the early-stage traffic and the pre-collected complete traffic. Holmes accurately identifies traffic in the early stages of page loading by computing the correlation of the traffic with the spatial distribution information, which ensures robust and reliable detection according to early-stage traffic. We extensively evaluate Holmes using six datasets. Compared to nine existing DL-based WF attacks, Holmes improves the F1-score of identifying early-stage traffic by an average of 169.18%. Furthermore, we replay the traffic of visiting real-world dark web websites. Holmes successfully identifies dark web websites when the ratio of page loading on average is only 21.71%, with an average precision improvement of 169.36% over the existing WF attacks.