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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
How Much Do Code Language Models Remember? An Investigati...
Fabio Salerno, Ali Al-Kaswan, Maliheh Izadi · 2025-01-29 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Code language models, while widely popular, are often trained on unsanitized source code gathered from across the Internet. Previous work revealed that pre-trained models can remember the content of their training data and regurgitate them through data extraction attacks. Due to the large size of current models, only a few entities have the resources for pre-training such models. However, fine-tuning requires fewer resources and is increasingly used by both small and large entities for its effectiveness on specialized data. Such small curated data for fine-tuning might contain sensitive information or proprietary assets. In this study, we attack both pre-trained and fine-tuned code language models to investigate the extent of data extractability. We first develop a custom benchmark to assess the vulnerability of both pre-training and fine-tuning samples to extraction attacks. Our findings reveal that 54.9% of extractable pre-training data could be retrieved from StarCoder2-15B, whereas this number decreased to 23.5% after fine-tuning. This indicates that fine-tuning reduces the extractability of pre-training data. However, compared to larger models, fine-tuning smaller models increases their vulnerability to data extraction attacks on fine-tuning data. Given the potential sensitivity of fine-tuning data, this can lead to more severe consequences. Lastly, we also manually analyzed 2000 extractable samples before and after fine-tuning. We also found that data carriers and licensing information are the most likely data categories to be memorized from pre-trained and fine-tuned models, while the latter is the most likely to be forgotten after fine-tuning.