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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
BDMMT: Backdoor Sample Detection for Language Models thro...
Jiali Wei, Ming Fan, Wenjing Jiao, Wuxia Jin, Ting Liu · 2023-01-25 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Deep neural networks (DNNs) and natural language processing (NLP) systems have developed rapidly and have been widely used in various real-world fields. However, they have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Specifically, the adversary injects a backdoor into the model during the training phase, so that input samples with backdoor triggers are classified as the target class. Some attacks have achieved high attack success rates on the pre-trained language models (LMs), but there have yet to be effective defense methods. In this work, we propose a defense method based on deep model mutation testing. Our main justification is that backdoor samples are much more robust than clean samples if we impose random mutations on the LMs and that backdoors are generalizable. We first confirm the effectiveness of model mutation testing in detecting backdoor samples and select the most appropriate mutation operators. We then systematically defend against three extensively studied backdoor attack levels (i.e., char-level, word-level, and sentence-level) by detecting backdoor samples. We also make the first attempt to defend against the latest style-level backdoor attacks. We evaluate our approach on three benchmark datasets (i.e., IMDB, Yelp, and AG news) and three style transfer datasets (i.e., SST-2, Hate-speech, and AG news). The extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach can detect backdoor samples more efficiently and accurately than the three state-of-the-art defense approaches.