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Non-Uniform L2 Cache Latency Across the Streaming Multipr...
[Submitted on 21 Jun 2026] · 2026-06-23 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:The NVIDIA L40 exposes a 96 MiB L2 cache usually modeled as one uniform pool with a single hit latency. We show this is wrong at the granularity a kernel sees: L2-hit latency depends strongly and reproducibly on which physical streaming multiprocessor (SM) issues the load. A turn-serialized, %smid-resolved probe maps the hit latency across all 142 SMs in one launch; it is not a constant near 279 cycles but spans 222-339 cycles (a 52% range), with per-repetition noise below 0.01 cycles. An additive model $L = \mu + a(\mathrm{sm}) + b(\mathrm{slice})$ explains $R^2 = 0.87$ (0.98 with one rank-1 term), and the SM term is two-fold symmetric (two halves of 72 SMs at correlation $r = 0.999$), following the AD102 GPC layout. Independent access patterns agree per SM at $r = 1.000$, so the effect is physical. The same probe on a Blackwell RTX 5090 shows it generalizes, while the per-die pattern is device-specific. Read as a fingerprint, a single user-level probe identifies the SM within a device at 92%, and two physically identical L40s are separated at 100% despite near-identical mean latency (per-SM map $r = 0.63$): a per-die hardware identity, not a clock artifact. This is a self-localization and fingerprinting primitive: a kernel reads its own placement and device, not a victim's, and extracts no secret data. The map is stable, unchanged after an hour at full utilization on both devices. As a consequence, distributing latency-bound work by the map cuts makespan by up to 11%. Single-thread capacity, line-tag, prefetch-modifier, and persisting-L2 results appear as controls. The artifact contains seeds, raw observations, the trained model, and regeneration scripts.

Submission history

From: Baris Basaran [view email]
[v1] Sun, 21 Jun 2026 16:50:45 UTC (36,752 KB)