惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

B
Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
月光博客
月光博客
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
博客园 - Franky
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
P
Proofpoint News Feed
F
Fortinet All Blogs
H
Help Net Security
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
V
Visual Studio Blog
Jina AI
Jina AI
J
Java Code Geeks
Blog — PlanetScale
Blog — PlanetScale
S
SegmentFault 最新的问题
D
DataBreaches.Net
T
The Blog of Author Tim Ferriss
美团技术团队
博客园 - 司徒正美
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Lear...
Shawn Shan, Emily Wenger, Jiayun Zhang, Huiying Li, Haitao Zheng · 2020-02-20 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Today's proliferation of powerful facial recognition systems poses a real threat to personal privacy. As Clearview.ai demonstrated, anyone can canvas the Internet for data and train highly accurate facial recognition models of individuals without their knowledge. We need tools to protect ourselves from potential misuses of unauthorized facial recognition systems. Unfortunately, no practical or effective solutions exist. In this paper, we propose Fawkes, a system that helps individuals inoculate their images against unauthorized facial recognition models. Fawkes achieves this by helping users add imperceptible pixel-level changes (we call them "cloaks") to their own photos before releasing them. When used to train facial recognition models, these "cloaked" images produce functional models that consistently cause normal images of the user to be misidentified. We experimentally demonstrate that Fawkes provides 95+% protection against user recognition regardless of how trackers train their models. Even when clean, uncloaked images are "leaked" to the tracker and used for training, Fawkes can still maintain an 80+% protection success rate. We achieve 100% success in experiments against today's state-of-the-art facial recognition services. Finally, we show that Fawkes is robust against a variety of countermeasures that try to detect or disrupt image cloaks.