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On the Security of Research Artifacts SafeHarbor: Hierarchical Memory-Augmented Guardrail for LLM Agent Safety Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety
Robustifying Safety-Aligned Large Language Models through...
Xiaoqun Liu, Jiacheng Liang, Muchao Ye, Zhaohan Xi · 2024-05-24 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable when trained on datasets containing harmful content, which leads to potential jailbreaking attacks in two scenarios: the integration of harmful texts within crowdsourced data used for pre-training and direct tampering with LLMs through fine-tuning. In both scenarios, adversaries can compromise the safety alignment of LLMs, exacerbating malfunctions. Motivated by the need to mitigate these adversarial influences, our research aims to enhance safety alignment by either neutralizing the impact of malicious texts in pre-training datasets or increasing the difficulty of jailbreaking during downstream fine-tuning. In this paper, we propose a data curation framework designed to counter adversarial impacts in both scenarios. Our method operates under the assumption that we have no prior knowledge of attack details, focusing solely on curating clean texts. We introduce an iterative process aimed at revising texts to reduce their perplexity as perceived by LLMs, while simultaneously preserving their text quality. By pre-training or fine-tuning LLMs with curated clean texts, we observe a notable improvement in LLM robustness regarding safety alignment against harmful queries. For instance, when pre-training LLMs using a crowdsourced dataset containing 5\% harmful instances, adding an equivalent amount of curated texts significantly mitigates the likelihood of providing harmful responses in LLMs and reduces the attack success rate by 71\%. Our study represents a significant step towards mitigating the risks associated with training-based jailbreaking and fortifying the secure utilization of LLMs.