惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
奇客Solidot–传递最新科技情报
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research
aimingoo的专栏
aimingoo的专栏
H
Help Net Security
腾讯CDC
T
Tailwind CSS Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
Hugging Face - Blog
人人都是产品经理
人人都是产品经理
酷 壳 – CoolShell
酷 壳 – CoolShell
MongoDB | Blog
MongoDB | Blog
宝玉的分享
宝玉的分享
有赞技术团队
有赞技术团队
美团技术团队
雷峰网
雷峰网
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
让小产品的独立变现更简单 - ezindie.com
博客园 - 司徒正美
博客园_首页
Recent Announcements
Recent Announcements
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
B
Blog RSS Feed
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
钛媒体:引领未来商业与生活新知
D
Docker
博客园 - Franky
Jina AI
Jina AI

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
PotentRegion4MalDetect: Advanced Features from Potential ...
Rama Krishna Koppanati, Monika Santra, Sateesh Kumar Peddoju · 2025-07-09 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Malware developers exploit the fact that most detection models focus on the entire binary to extract the feature rather than on the regions of potential maliciousness. Therefore, they reverse engineer a benign binary and inject malicious code into it. This obfuscation technique circumvents the malware detection models and deceives the ML classifiers due to the prevalence of benign features compared to malicious features. However, extracting the features from the potential malicious regions enhances the accuracy and decreases false positives. Hence, we propose a novel model named PotentRegion4MalDetect that extracts features from the potential malicious regions. PotentRegion4MalDetect determines the nodes with potential maliciousness in the partially preprocessed Control Flow Graph (CFG) using the malicious strings given by StringSifter. Then, it extracts advanced features of the identified potential malicious regions alongside the features from the completely preprocessed CFG. The features extracted from the completely preprocessed CFG mitigate obfuscation techniques that attempt to disguise malicious content, such as suspicious strings. The experiments reveal that the PotentRegion4MalDetect requires fewer entries to save the features for all binaries than the model focusing on the entire binary, reducing memory overhead, faster computation, and lower storage requirements. These advanced features give an 8.13% increase in SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) Absolute Mean and a 1.44% increase in SHAP Beeswarm value compared to those extracted from the entire binary. The advanced features outperform the features extracted from the entire binary by producing more than 99% accuracy, precision, recall, AUC, F1-score, and 0.064% FPR.