While convenient, relying on LLM-powered code assistants in day-to-day work gives rise to severe attacks. For instance, the assistant might introduce subtle flaws and suggest vulnerable code to the user. These adversarial code-suggestions can be introduced via data poisoning and, thus, unknowingly by the model creators. In this paper, we provide a generalized formulation of such attacks, spawning and extending related work in this domain. This formulation is defined over two components: First, a trigger pattern occurring in the prompts of a specific user group, and, second, a learnable map in embedding space from the prompt to an adversarial bait. The latter gives rise to novel and more flexible targeted attack-strategies, allowing the adversary to choose the most suitable trigger pattern for a specific user-group arbitrarily, without restrictions on the pattern's tokens. Our directional-map attacks and prompt-indexing attacks increase the stealthiness decisively. We extensively evaluate the effectiveness of these attacks and carefully investigate defensive mechanisms to explore the limits of generalized adversarial code-suggestions. We find that most defenses unfortunately offer little protection only.