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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in Neuro-Symbolic AI
[Submitted on 15 Jun 2026] · 2026-06-17 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Neuro-symbolic AI (NeSy) pairs neural perception with symbolic reasoning, making it attractive for high-stakes domains where explainability and structured inference are required. However, this hybrid architecture introduces an enlarged attack surface spanning five layers: neural perception, symbolic knowledge bases, reasoning engines, agentic orchestration, and data stores -- each exploitable in ways absent from purely neural systems.
This paper makes six contributions: (1) formal definitions of NeSy Attack Surface, Symbolic Integrity Violation (SIV), and Cross-Layer Amplification Ratio $\mathcal{X}$, decomposed into neural-caused and autonomous symbolic sensitivity components; (2) a unified threat model extending MITRE ATLAS with 11 NeSy-specific tactic extensions and a five-profile attacker taxonomy; (3) a symbolic-layer threat catalogue covering knowledge graph (KG) poisoning, ontology-merging, and inference-engine subversion; (4) analysis of cognitive risks -- automation bias, authority bias, and sycophantic reinforcement -- structurally amplified by NeSy's explicit logical explanations relative to black-box neural outputs; (5) interdisciplinary mitigations with measurable acceptance criteria aligned to NIST AI 600-1 and the EU AI Act; (6) three empirical benchmarks: (E1) targeted KG poisoning achieves break-even SIV at injection budget $B=5$ on a 205-entity medical KG, with a KG-specific stealth/SIV trade-off; (E2) PGD-10 at $\varepsilon=0.01$ yields $\mathcal{X}=5.884$ (95% CI $[4.64,\, 8.00]$, $p<0.0001$), confirmed adversarially specific by a matched-random baseline ($E^{R}_{\mathrm{rand}}=0$), on a DistilBERT+ProbLog pipeline; (E3) single-axiom OWL edits achieve 93.3% SIV success with 100% Pellet-consistency stealth, but held-out STIX detection fails at 50% (random-guessing level), an open problem.

Submission history

From: Manojkumar Parmar [view email]
[v1] Mon, 15 Jun 2026 19:11:55 UTC (233 KB)