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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Hacking of the AES with Boolean Functions
Michel Dubois, Eric Filiol · 2016-09-13 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

One of the major issues of cryptography is the cryptanalysis of cipher algorithms. Cryptanalysis is the study of methods for obtaining the meaning of encrypted information, without access to the secret information that is normally required. Some mechanisms for breaking codes include differential cryptanalysis, advanced statistics and brute-force. Recent works also attempt to use algebraic tools to reduce the cryptanalysis of a block cipher algorithm to the resolution of a system of quadratic equations describing the ciphering structure. In our study, we will also use algebraic tools but in a new way: by using Boolean functions and their properties. A Boolean function is a function from $F_2^n\to F_2$ with $n>1$, characterized by its truth table. The arguments of Boolean functions are binary words of length $n$. Any Boolean function can be represented, uniquely, by its algebraic normal form which is an equation which only contains additions modulo 2 - the XOR function - and multiplications modulo 2 - the AND function. Our aim is to describe the AES algorithm as a set of Boolean functions then calculate their algebraic normal forms by using the Möbius transforms. After, we use a specific representation for these equations to facilitate their analysis and particularly to try a combinatorial analysis. Through this approach we obtain a new kind of equations system. This equations system is more easily implementable and could open new ways to cryptanalysis.