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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Quotient Semivalues for False-Name-Resistant Data Attribu...
Florian A. D · 2026-05-11 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

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Abstract:Data valuation methods allocate payments and audit training data's contribution to machine-learning pipelines; however, they often assume passive contributors. In reality, contributors can split datasets across pseudonymous identities, duplicate high-value examples, create near-duplicates, or launder synthetic variants to inflate their share. We formalize this as false-name manipulation in ML data attribution. Our main construction is the quotient semivalue mechanism: compute Shapley-, Banzhaf-, or Beta-style values over evidence-backed attribution clusters instead of raw identities, using a canonical-representative operator to absorb within-cluster duplication. We prove an impossibility: on a fixed monotone data-value game, exact Shapley-fair attribution over reported identities is incompatible with unrestricted false-name-proofness, even on binary-valued instances, and characterize the split-gain of a general semivalue on a unanimity counter-example. The mechanism is exactly false-name-proof under two structural conditions: false-name-neutral within-cluster allocation and quotient-stable manipulations. Under imperfect provenance, when these conditions hold approximately, manipulation gain and fairness loss are bounded by three measurable quantities: escaped-cluster mass, value-estimation error, and clustering distance. We instantiate the mechanisms in DataMarket-Gym, a benchmark for attribution under strategic provider attacks. On synthetic classification tasks, quotient semivalues with example-level evidence reduce manipulation gain on duplicate and near-duplicate Sybil attacks from $1.74$ under baseline Shapley to $0.96$, near the honest level. The cosine-threshold and (false-merge, false-split) rate sweeps trace the corresponding fairness--Sybil frontier.
Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.07663 [cs.GT]
  (or arXiv:2605.07663v1 [cs.GT] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.07663

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Florian Burnat [view email]
[v1] Fri, 8 May 2026 12:34:20 UTC (265 KB)