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Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
The Sample Complexity of Membership Inference and Privacy...
Mahdi Haghifam, Adam Smith, Jonathan Ullman · 2025-08-27 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

A membership-inference attack gets the output of a learning algorithm, and a target individual, and tries to determine whether this individual is a member of the training data or an independent sample from the same distribution. A successful membership-inference attack typically requires the attacker to have some knowledge about the distribution that the training data was sampled from, and this knowledge is often captured through a set of independent reference samples from that distribution. In this work we study how much information the attacker needs for membership inference by investigating the sample complexity-the minimum number of reference samples required-for a successful attack. We study this question in the fundamental setting of Gaussian mean estimation where the learning algorithm is given $n$ samples from a Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{N}(μ,Σ)$ in $d$ dimensions, and tries to estimate $\hatμ$ up to some error $\mathbb{E}[\|\hat μ- μ\|^2_Σ]\leq ρ^2 d$. Our result shows that for membership inference in this setting, $Ω(n + n^2 ρ^2)$ samples can be necessary to carry out any attack that competes with a fully informed attacker. Our result is the first to show that the attacker sometimes needs many more samples than the training algorithm uses to train the model. This result has significant implications for practice, as all attacks used in practice have a restricted form that uses $O(n)$ samples and cannot benefit from $ω(n)$ samples. Thus, these attacks may be underestimating the possibility of membership inference, and better attacks may be possible when information about the distribution is easy to obtain.