惯性聚合 高效追踪和阅读你感兴趣的博客、新闻、科技资讯
阅读原文 在惯性聚合中打开

推荐订阅源

小众软件
小众软件
博客园_首页
M
MIT News - Artificial intelligence
雷峰网
雷峰网
GbyAI
GbyAI
博客园 - 叶小钗
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
Cyber Security Advisories - MS-ISAC
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
OSCHINA 社区最新新闻
V
V2EX
S
SegmentFault 最新的问题
H
Help Net Security
Apple Machine Learning Research
Apple Machine Learning Research
H
Hackread – Cybersecurity News, Data Breaches, AI and More
博客园 - 【当耐特】
V
Visual Studio Blog
月光博客
月光博客
G
Google Developers Blog
freeCodeCamp Programming Tutorials: Python, JavaScript, Git & More
腾讯CDC
云风的 BLOG
云风的 BLOG
美团技术团队
Microsoft Azure Blog
Microsoft Azure Blog
A
About on SuperTechFans
有赞技术团队
有赞技术团队

cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
CATER: Intellectual Property Protection on Text Generatio...
Xuanli He, Qiongkai Xu, Yi Zeng, Lingjuan Lyu, Fangzhao Wu, Jiwe · 2022-09-19 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Previous works have validated that text generation APIs can be stolen through imitation attacks, causing IP violations. In order to protect the IP of text generation APIs, a recent work has introduced a watermarking algorithm and utilized the null-hypothesis test as a post-hoc ownership verification on the imitation models. However, we find that it is possible to detect those watermarks via sufficient statistics of the frequencies of candidate watermarking words. To address this drawback, in this paper, we propose a novel Conditional wATERmarking framework (CATER) for protecting the IP of text generation APIs. An optimization method is proposed to decide the watermarking rules that can minimize the distortion of overall word distributions while maximizing the change of conditional word selections. Theoretically, we prove that it is infeasible for even the savviest attacker (they know how CATER works) to reveal the used watermarks from a large pool of potential word pairs based on statistical inspection. Empirically, we observe that high-order conditions lead to an exponential growth of suspicious (unused) watermarks, making our crafted watermarks more stealthy. In addition, \cater can effectively identify the IP infringement under architectural mismatch and cross-domain imitation attacks, with negligible impairments on the generation quality of victim APIs. We envision our work as a milestone for stealthily protecting the IP of text generation APIs.