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cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on Windows COM Binaries From Beats to Breaches:How Offensive AI Infers Sensitive User Information from Playlists Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions When Embedding-Based Defenses Fail: Rethinking Safety in LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems Token-Efficient Change Detection in LLM APIs Selfie-Capture Dynamics as an Auxiliary Signal Against Deepfakes and Injection Attacks for Mobile Identity Verification Trident: Improving Malware Detection with LLMs and Behavioral Features When Alignment Isn't Enough: Response-Path Attacks on LLM Agents RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget Block-wise Codeword Embedding for Reliable Multi-bit Text Watermarking Secret Stealing Attacks on Local LLM Fine-Tuning through Supply-Chain Model Code Backdoors Enhancing Linux Privilege Escalation Attack Capabilities of Local LLM Agents Defusing the Trigger: Plug-and-Play Defense for Backdoored LLMs via Tail-Risk Intrinsic Geometric Smoothing Evaluating Jailbreaking Vulnerabilities in LLMs Deployed as Assistants for Smart Grid Operations: A Benchmark Against NERC Standards Behavioral Canaries: Auditing Private Retrieved Context Usage in RL Fine-Tuning FlexServe: A Fast and Secure LLM Serving System for Mobile Devices with Flexible Resource Isolation Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models Text Steganography with Dynamic Codebook and Multimodal Large Language Model An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models Fundamental Limitations of Favorable Privacy-Utility Guarantees for DP-SGD Symbolic Guardrails for Domain-Specific Agents: Stronger Safety and Security Guarantees Without Sacrificing Utility Hardening x402: PII-Safe Agentic Payments via Pre-Execution Metadata Filtering QShield: Securing Neural Networks Against Adversarial Attacks using Quantum Circuits Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit Private Seeds, Public LLMs: Realistic and Privacy-Preserving Synthetic Data Generation One Word at a Time: Incremental Completion Decomposition Breaks LLM Safety Measuring and Exploiting Contextual Bias in LLM-Assisted Security Code Review
Survey of Transient Execution Attacks
Wenjie Xiong, Jakub Szefer · 2020-05-27 · via cs.CR updates on arXiv.org

Transient execution attacks, also called speculative execution attacks, have drawn much interest as they exploit the transient execution of instructions, e.g., during branch prediction, to leak data. Transient execution is fundamental to modern computer architectures, yet poses a security risk as has been demonstrated. Since the first disclosure of Spectre and Meltdown attacks in January 2018, a number of new attack types or variants of the attacks have been presented. These attacks have motivated computer architects to rethink the design of processors and propose hardware defenses. This paper summarizes the components and the phases of the transient execution attacks. Each of the components is further discussed and categorized. A set of metrics is proposed for each component to evaluate the feasibility of an attack. Moreover, the data that can be leaked in the attacks are summarized. Further, the existing attacks are compared, and the limitations of these attacks are discussed based on the proposed metrics. In the end, existing mitigations at the micro-architecture level from literature are discussed.